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Abstract 
 
Hosni Mubarak’s regime and its power system enjoyed remarkable stability for over 30 years. On 11 
February 2011, after 18 days of mass protests, the Egyptian president was forced to step down, revealing the 
unsustainability of the political and economic system that had ensured his continuity for so long. While the 
revolution of January 25th led to a major success – the fall of Hosni Mubarak – Egypt’s political future is still 
opaque and exposed to a number of risks. This paper first highlights the factors underpinning the former 
stability of Mubarak’s regime; it then assesses the causes of its underlying unsustainability, leading to the 
anti-government popular mobilisation in January-February 2011 and the removal of Mubarak; finally the 
paper evaluates the prospects for a genuine democratic transition in Egypt, by looking at the main political 
and socio-economic challenges facing the country. 
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Introduction 
Hosni Mubarak’s regime and its power system enjoyed remarkable stability over thirty years. 
On 11 February 2011, after 18 days of mass protests, the Egyptian president was forced to step 
down, revealing the unsustainability of the political and economic system that had ensured his 
continuity for so long.1 While the revolution of January 25th led to a major success – the fall of 
Hosni Mubarak – Egypt’s political future is still opaque and exposed to a number of risks. This 
paper first highlights the factors underpinning the former stability of Mubarak’s regime; it then 
assesses the causes of its underlying unsustainability, culminating in the anti-government 
popular mobilisation in January-February 2011 and the removal of Mubarak; finally the paper 
evaluates the prospects for a genuine democratic transition in Egypt, by looking at the main 
political and socio-economic challenges facing the country. 
1. Behind the veil of stability of Hosni Mubarak’s regime (1981-February 2011) 
1.1 “From Relative Tolerance to Neo-authoritarianism”2 
Hosni Mubarak rose to power in 1981, after Anwar Sadat’s assassination. After a period of 
relative tolerance in the 1980s, Mubarak’s authoritarian rule deepened in the 1990s: civil and 
political rights were restricted; the party law was amended; press freedom was significantly 
limited and repression was used against political opponents, particularly the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB).3 Owing to these restrictions and to widespread interference in the electoral 
process through fraud, repression and intimidation, the parliamentary elections of 1990, 19954 
                                                     
∗ Maria Cristina Paciello is researcher for Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome and lecturer in 
Economic and Political Geography of Development at La Sapienza University of Rome. The author is 
indebted to Dr Rym Ayadi, Prof. Abdul-Monem Al Mashat, Prof. Alia El-Mehdi and Dr Nathalie Tocci 
for their insightful comments. 
1 For insights on the analytical framework that informs this paper, including the distinction between short-
term stability and long-term sustainability, see Silvia Colombo’s paper (Colombo, 2010), published 
within the MEDPRO project. 
2 This expression is taken from Benin (2009: 21). 
3 Relevant constitutional changes included the 1993 Syndicates Law and 1999 Nongovernmental 
Associations Law, which curtailed the freedom of association by imposing governmental regulations and 
harsh penalties for violations; the Amendments to the party law, voted in December 1992, which barred 
founders of new parties from accepting foreign funds and from conducting any political activity in the 
name of their party before it is officially recognised; and the 1995 Press Law, which significantly limited 
press freedom (for details, see Kienle, 1998; Dunne, 2006; Benin, 2009; Pioppi, 2004; Al-Din Arafat, 
2009). 
4 The 1995 elections represented the peak in terms of direct interference by the regime, fraud and 
repression. Although, unlike in the 1990 elections, in 1995, the Muslim Brothers participated, none of 
their 150 candidates, who stood as independent candidates or candidates of the Labour Party, was able to 
win a seat (Naguib, 2009). 
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and 20005 resulted in an unprecedented majority for the ruling party, the National Democratic 
Party (NDP).  
In the early 2000s, alongside the second Palestinian Intifada and, successively, the American 
invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, Egypt started experiencing growing political 
dynamism. In 2004-05, protests intensified, with a number of opposition parties and movements 
(e.g. the Kifaya movement, the Judges Club, al Ghad party and the MB) demanding political 
reform, including the amendment of the constitution in order to allow for competitive 
presidential elections, the end of the state of emergency, the removal of restrictive legal 
constraints on the activities of parties, civil society organisations and the media, and a free and 
fair electoral process. 
In response to the above-mentioned pressures, the regime was thus forced to make some, albeit 
limited, concessions, enacting a series of amendments to the constitution (El-Issandr, 2005; 
Benin, 2009; Dunne & Hamzawy, 2007; Dunne et al., 2007). However, in spite of the 
constitutional changes that allowed for the direct popular election of the president, the 
conditions for candidate eligibility remained very strict, effectively enabling the NDP to decide 
who could run against the incumbent (Dunne, 2006).6 Moreover, the party laws still precluded a 
realistic possibility of anyone other than the NDP coming into power (ibid.).7 As a result, 
although the first multi-candidate presidential elections were held in September 2005 and nine 
candidates ran against the President, Mubarak, as expected, won the election with 87% of the 
vote.8 Similarly, at the 2005 parliamentary elections, the NDP continued to manage electoral 
politics, through vote buying, fraud and intimidation.  
Nevertheless, at the 2005 elections, the Brotherhood candidates were allowed to campaign 
much more openly than in the past, albeit as independents, and non-governmental organizations 
monitored the elections (Sullivan, 2009).9 So, while the ruling NDP maintained its two-thirds 
majority, the Muslim Brothers made significant gains, for the first time, obtaining, with the 
victory of 88 candidates, more seats (20% of total) than any other opposition group (ibid.).  
The unexpected electoral success of the MB paved the way for the regime to take a series of de-
liberalisation measures: cracking down on political opponents and popular protests, particularly 
                                                     
5 The 2000 parliamentary elections were, by most accounts, somewhat more credible than previous ones 
because for, the first time, they were supervised by judges. Nonetheless, as long as the emergency law 
was in force, the regime continued to interfere in the electoral process through fraud and widespread 
arrests of MB candidates as well as intimidation of voters outside polling stations. So, while the NDP 
performed poorly compared to previous elections and seventeen of the independents candidates elected 
belonged to the MB, the ruling party maintained its absolute majority in the People’s Assembly 
(Abdulbaki, 2008).  
6 Amended Article 76 of the Presidential Election Law gives each licensed party the right to field a 
candidate in the ballot, subject to stiff conditions. The party may only nominate a candidate that has been 
on its executive committee for at least one year, thereby preventing any party from nominating a popular 
figure outside the small circle of mostly elderly, well-known politicians (Dunne, 2006). 
7 The amended Political Parties Law maintained bans on parties with a religious identity (effectively 
barring the MB). It also revised the composition of the Political Parties Committee (PPC), which 
considers applications by new parties, by increasing its control over parties and the presence of senior 
NDP members, thus reinforcing the ruling party’s domination over the opposition (Dunne, 2006). 
8 Ayman Nour, the leader of al-Ghad Party, came second with 7% of the vote. This led to his five year 
imprisonment sentence.  
9 Unlike in 2000, none of the Brotherhood’s campaigners were arrested in the run-up to the first round. 
Arrests took place after the first-round results, which revealed the strong showing of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Sullivan, 2009).  
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on MB members; postponing local elections, scheduled for April 2006, in order to avoid another 
success of the Brotherhood; and extending the state of emergency for another two years (see 
Sullivan 2009; see also el-Ghobashy, 2010; Shehata, 2009). Moreover, in 2007, the regime 
introduced a series of amendments that further constrained political freedom, such as removing 
the judiciary’s role as electoral supervisor, empowering the president to dissolve parliament 
without referendum, banning explicitly religious parties, thus curtailing attempts by the 
Brothers to form a political party, and giving Mubarak the authority to refer civilians suspected 
of terrorism offences for trial in military tribunals (see Brown et al., 2007).  
From 2007, these and other restrictions, together with an increased use of police detention and 
arrests, reduced significantly the participation of opposition forces in political life. In the 2007 
elections for the upper house parliament, the Shura Council, the Muslim Brothers did not win 
any seats, while at the local elections of April 2008, they announced a last-minute boycott of the 
elections after nearly all of its candidates, as well as most candidates from legal opposition 
parties, were prevented from registering.10 Finally, the 28 November 2010 legislative elections 
were marked by unprecedented widespread violations, arrests of hundreds of MB activists 
before the vote, violence and pressure on the media, leading to the inevitable victory of the 
NDP, with an overwhelming majority of seats (Dunne & Hamzawy, 2010). The MB failed to 
win a single seat at the first runoff election and, together with the New Wafd party, they decided 
to boycott the runoff election a week later.11 
1.2 The weakness of opposition forces  
Under the rule of Hosni Mubarak, the political opposition in Egypt was very weak due to many 
factors. As said above, the regime implemented a number of instruments to weaken opposition: 
repression and harassment; refusal to legalise parties and organisations that could threaten the 
regime; electoral manipulation; and co-option of many non-governmental associations and trade 
unions.12 Furthermore, the long-standing emergency law, in place since 1981, served to prohibit 
strikes, censor newspapers and constrain any activities of the opposition in the name of national 
security.  
Aside repression, legal secularist parties were weak also because of internal deficiencies: lack of 
internal democracy, little organisational capacity, lack of resources and, most importantly, 
limited constituencies (Holger, 2005, El-Shobaki, 2010, al-Din Arafat, 2009). New movements 
such as Kifaya (the Egyptian Movement for Change – “Enough”), which appeared in the winter 
of 2004, initially appeared more dynamic than legal parties, engaging in numerous public 
protests, directly criticising Mubarak and his family, and opposing his re-election and Gamal’s 
hereditary succession. However, Kifaya was rather ineffective in obtaining concrete concessions 
from the regime and after 2006 became dormant (al-Sayyid, 2009; al-Din Arafat, 2009). In 
addition to harsher repression by the regime, the movement also failed to mobilise large popular 
support, being limited to students, intellectuals and middle-class professionals; it lacked a clear 
long-term strategy, with no positive democratic demands. After 2007 it was weakened further 
by internal divisions that led to the resignation of the movement’s founder George Ishak (ibid.).  
                                                     
10 “Salary and Price Increases in Egypt; Local Elections; Brothers Sentenced”, Arab Reform Bulletin, 12 
May 2008 (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article=20502). 
11 “Egypt's November 28 parliamentary elections”, Arab Reform Bulletin, 30 November 2010 
(http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article=42032). 
12 The only official trade union was the state-controlled Egyptian Trade Unions Federation (ETUF). On 
Egyptian trade unions under Mubarak, see Clément (2009), Moore & Salloukh (2007), UNDP (2008), al-
Din Arafat (2009), Beinin & el-Hamalawy (2007); on NGOs, see Guirguis (2009). 
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The Islamist movement of Muslim Brothers, the only opposition force with mass popular 
support, was unable to seriously challenge the regime and press for genuine political change. 
The MB was able to attract a large number of supporters, mainly because it took over the task of 
providing social services, from which the state progressively disengaged over the mid-1980s-
1990s (Harrigan & el-Said, 2009). Due to its large social basis, the MB succeeded in winning an 
unprecedented number of seats in the 2005 elections. However, after 2005, when the Muslim 
Brothers won a large share in parliament, the regime sought to oust the movement from the 
political scene through increased repression and amending the constitution in 2007. Because the 
MB was subject to frequent harassment, leadership arrests and confiscation of financial assets, 
especially in recent years, it generally kept a moderate, cautious, and non-confrontational 
approach towards the regime, fearing to be completely eliminated from political life (Pioppi, 
2011). So, although the movement remained the main opposition force in the country, it was 
reluctant both to take any clear action against the regime and to make formal alliances with 
other opposition actors, leaving to other opposition movements the political initiative (ibid.). In 
this light, the Muslim Brothers did not adhere to Muhammad al-Baradei’s call for a boycott of 
the 2010 parliamentary elections; they did not clearly oppose the re-election of Hosni Mubarak 
in 2005 and the potential candidacy of his son Gamal in 2011; and they lacked a clear political 
programme, revealing their incapacity or unwillingness to represent a solid alternative to the 
regime (Pioppi, 2011; el Shobaki, 2010). Lastly, deep ideological divisions between the MB and 
many secular opposition groups prevented the emergence of a united and organised political 
opposition to the regime (Al-Din Arafat, 2009; Brown et al., 2006). 
Opposition beyond the strict confines of political activity revealed greater dynamism. Since 
mid-2004, social protests and demonstrations, reflecting the rising discontent among people, 
became a prominent feature of Egyptian life. Egypt experienced an unprecedented wave of 
street protests, particularly labour strikes, reflecting the increased hardship experienced by large 
swathes of Egyptians (Beinin, 2009; Clément, 2009; Beinin & el-Halamawy, 2007a, 2007b). In 
2010, labour unrests continued, spreading in particular to those private sector workers whose 
companies were affected by the financial crisis.13 Unlike political parties and other organised 
opposition forces, the labour protests were successful in attracting an unprecedented number of 
people,14 but they did not translate into a real political challenge to the regime, pressing for 
political transformation. Unlike the January-February 2011 protests, these protests remained 
apolitical, meaning that they focused on socio-economic problems and did not put forward 
political demands (El-Mahdi, 2010; Hamzawy, 2009; Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2011). 
Furthermore, the protests did not coordinate their action with political organisations, instead 
they were sporadic and totally dispersed. The major opposition parties and other movements, 
such as the Muslim Brothers, were detached from the social and labour protests of the last years, 
reflecting the interests of a different constituency, namely urban upper middle class. Also the 
MB was suspicious about a rapprochement to the labour movement, because, due to its social 
composition15 and conservative worldview, it is hostile to class conflict (Pioppi, 2011; Naguib 
2009). 
                                                     
13 “Labor unrest persists among private sector workers”, al-Masry al-Yom, 6 August 2010 
(http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/labor-unrest-persists-among-private-sector-workers). 
14 From 2004 to 2008, more than 1.7 million workers participated in over 1,900 labour-related protests 
(see Shadi Hamid, “Egypt’s Old and New Opposition – And Why They Need Each Other December 
2010” (http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2010/12_egypt_politics_hamid.aspx). 
15 The MB has never had a strong base in the industrial working class and, in fact, 60% of the 88 MB’s 
MPs elected to the People Assembly in 2005 were educated professionals (see Beinin, 2009).  
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1.3 Economic reforms as a tool to consolidate/restructure the regime’s power 
system 
In the mid-1980s, due to the decline in oil prices and remittances by Egyptian expatriates, Egypt 
was faced with rising economic difficulties associated with serious foreign debt problems. To 
cope with the crisis, in 1991, Egypt committed to pursue market-oriented reforms, after signing 
an agreement under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
(WB). The economic reforms initiated in the early 1990s are among the major tools exploited 
by Mubarak’s regime to consolidate its power system and preserve its stability.  
While stabilisation measures were implemented rapidly, structural reforms such as privatisation 
and trade liberalisation were carried out gradually (Paciello, 2007), at least until 2004, when, 
under Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, they were accelerated (Wurzel, 2009; Alissa 2007). 
Selective economic liberalisation served to stabilise the regime in various ways. First, by 
keeping untouched politically sensitive economic sectors, selective economic reforms did not 
harm the interests of the established ruling elite, thus preserving the privileged position of many 
regime supporters such as the military (Heydemann, 2007). Thanks to its vested interests in the 
status quo, the military was very influential in ensuring Egypt’s stability and the continuity of 
the regime (Droz-Vincent, 2009). Second, given the gradual pace of reforms, the negative social 
effects generally associated with full scale (neo)liberal economic reforms were, at least initially, 
mitigated (Paciello, 2007). For example, in the 1990s, the regime postponed important 
privatisation steps in order to avoid a fundamental restructuring of the public sector causing 
major social dislocations, which could have potentially threatened its support base and stability. 
Yet, mass lay-offs resulting from privatisation measures were initially avoided by an 
arrangement, whereby workers were entitled to keep jobs in the privatised companies for at least 
three years (El-Mikawy & Pripstein Posusney 2000). Third, while retaining control over 
strategic economic sectors, the regime used economic liberalisation to re-distribute privileges to 
regime supporters and co-opt important segments of the private sector, thus reinforcing its 
social basis (Alissa, 2007; Beinin, 2009; Wurzel, 2004, 2009; Heydemann, 2007; Richter, 
2007). Privatisation is a case in point, as it benefited only men with connections to Egyptian 
politicians and the military establishment (Wurzel, 2009; Heydemann, 2007; Alissa, 2007; 
Droz-Vincent 2009; Sfakianakis, 2004). The cooption of well-connected businessmen, whose 
businesses profited only thanks to their privileged links to the regime, meant that they had no 
interest in challenging the power structure, thus ensuring the regime’s stability.  
1.4 The role of external actors 
Beyond entrenching authoritarian practices, weak opposition forces and the manipulation of 
socio-economic reforms, the survival of Mubarak’s regime was also aided by the support 
conferred to it by Western governments. Both the EU and the US were very cautious, moderate 
and inconsistent in advancing political reform in Egypt, fearing that this would destabilise the 
country and therefore, their vital interests in the region (Durac, 2009).16 The Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership and the ensuing European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) are both 
indicative of this cautious approach by the EU. For example, the ENP Action Plan for Egypt 
was adopted in a context of serious political regression in the country, epitomized by the 2007 
                                                     
16 The 9/11 terrorist attacks temporarily changed this strategic approach, with the US being more assertive 
in pressing the Egyptian regime for political change, but since early 2006, a number of regional 
developments (including the deteriorating situation in Iraq and the need to ensure Egypt’s support in the 
global war on terror, the Muslim Brothers’ success at the 2005 elections, Hamas’ victory in the 2006 
Palestinian elections, and the war between Israel and Lebanon in the summer of 2006) led to a significant 
decline in democracy promotion efforts in Egypt and in the region as a whole (Droz-Vincent, 2009).  
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constitutional amendments. Notwithstanding, the Action Plan omitted any mention of changing 
these regressive laws, discussing only the need to “strengthen participation in political life, 
including the promotion of public awareness and participation in elections” or “to exchange 
experience in the field of elections and jointly develop cooperation in areas of shared interest 
including through providing assistance on registering electors and capacity building”.17 The US 
response to the 2007 constitutional amendments was also very timid.18 
Similarly, the US and the EU were ambiguous towards opposition forces in Egypt. For example, 
they were silent about the repression of Islamist actors, concerned of the security consequences 
of an Islamist empowerment in the country (Balfour & Cugusi, 2010; Droz-Vincent, 2010). 
Both the EU and the US privileged relations with the ruling elite, while doing little to promote 
dialogue with non-state actors. Unlike the case of the eastern neighbours, the Action Plan was 
not discussed with major political actors and civil society organisations, but was instead 
negotiated with a select group of senior policy-makers who ensured that reforms did not 
destabilise their grip on power (Youngs, 2006). 
In addition, in spite of Egypt’s poor record in political reform, Western governments continued 
to renew their economic support to the Egyptian regime, renouncing to attach any positive or 
negative conditionality to their aid. Egypt under Mubarak was among the largest recipients of 
US aid, second only to Israel. Furthermore, the Obama administration in early 2009 discarded 
all references to human rights or democracy in statements on Egypt (Dunne, 2011). Despite a 
deepening of authoritarianism, for the period 2011-2013, the EU increased its European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) funds to Egypt, while reducing the ENPI 
funds specifically allocated to the promotion and protection of human rights.19  
2. Explaining the Unsustainability of Hosni Mubarak’s Regime 
A combination of political, socio-economic and external factors ensured Hosni Mubarak’s rule 
over thirty years. Politically, Mubarak’s regime was able to tightly control the political process, 
by alternating phases of relatively, albeit limited, opening, to phases of deepening 
authoritarianism and harsh repression. The regime thus limited civil and political rights, 
repressed political opponents, and managed carefully the electoral process. At the same time, it 
also created some space for dissenting political expression and allowed opposition forces, such 
as the Muslim Brothers, to participate in elections as independent candidates. Economically, the 
regime managed to implement market-oriented reforms gradually, resisting deep structural 
reforms that would have both harmed the ruling’s elites’ economic interests and entailed 
disrupting social dislocations. Also, while retaining its control over strategic economic sectors, 
the regime used economic liberalisation to re-distribute privileges to its supporters and co-opt 
important segments of the private sector, thus extending its support. All this was done with the 
active support of the West. However, over the last decade, the underlying unsustainability of 
Mubarak’s regime increasingly came to the fore, leading its stability to ultimately crack. Rapid 
economic growth matched by growing inequalities, worsening poverty levels and rising youth 
unemployment among educated, and deepening political repression matched by grassroots 
mobilisation, lie at the heart of the destabilisation of Mubarak’s regime.    
                                                     
17 See EU/Egypt Action Plan, pp. 5-6 (http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm). 
18 Andrew Exum and Zack Snyder, “Democracy Demotion in Egypt: Is the United States a Willing 
Accomplice?”, Policy Watch, 23/03/2007. 
19 See European Commission, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Egypt and Egypt 
Country Strategy Paper. 
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2.1 Rapid economic growth with no re-distribution  
In the period 2003-07, Egypt experienced strong economic growth, which reached the peak of 
7.1% in 2006-07, as well as a rapid increase in exports and FDI inflows (see Achcar, 2009; 
IMF, 2007). However, promoting strong economic growth and market-oriented economic 
reforms were not sufficient to address Egypt’s main socio-economic challenges. In spite of its 
outstanding macro-economic performance, a growing part of Egyptians, from the lower-middle 
class, experienced a dramatic increase in hardship. This meant that most Egyptians did not 
benefit from the rapid economic growth. While Egypt’s economic and social policies were 
insufficient to address its main socio-economic challenges, their ineffectiveness primarily 
depended on political factors. As said above, economic reforms served the interests of the ruling 
elite and their close associates, allowing them to reinforce their power, while excluding the rest 
of the population. Moreover, opposition forces were unable to influence decision-making, 
particularly with regard to economic and social issues, because they were repressed and because 
parliament lacked authority. However, in the long term, this form of economic management, 
which was profoundly rooted in the authoritarian and coercive nature of the Egyptian regime, 
proved unsustainable. It perpetuated economic inefficiencies, hindered the emergence of an 
autonomous, competitive and productive private sector and led to widespread corruption.  
Diminishing purchasing power and rising income poverty 
Consumer purchasing power in Egypt significantly diminished over the last decade. In the 
2000s, mainly driven by a rise in food prices, the consumer price index (CPI) shot up, reaching 
an unprecedented peak of 23.6% in August 2008 (Alissa, 2007; Jones et al., 2009). Since then, 
although food price inflation declined, it remained quite high and volatile.20 Moreover, real 
wages in both the public and private sectors continued to decrease over the last decade 
(Abdelhamid & el-Baradei, 2009), meaning that, for many Egyptians, wages were inadequate to 
cover rising prices and sustain a decent standard of living.21 This inflationary trend over the last 
decade had a disproportionate effect on middle and lower income Egyptians, for whom a large 
share of income is spent on food items (Klau, 2010). Soaring food prices was the main cause of 
rising income poverty over the last decade. In particular, the incidence of absolute poverty22 
increased from 16.7% in 2000-01 to 23.4% in 2008/2009 (Jones et al., 2009; UNICEF, 2010; 
World Bank, 2007), reversing the gains made in the second half of the 1990s.23  
                                                     
20 Niveen, Wahish, “Of prices and interest rates”, Al-Ahram Weekly, 19-25 February 2009 
(http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/935/ec2.htm); Ali Abdel Mohsen, “Meat market mystery”, Al-Masry 
al-Youm, 2 April 2010 (http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/meat-market-mystery); “Egypt inflation 
steady in October, rates seen on hold”,  Al-Masry al-Youm, 10 November 2010 
(http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/egypt-inflation-steady-october-rates-seen-hold); Ashraf Khalil, 
“Egypt’s vegetable crisis: 'This is how revolutions start'”, Al-Masry al-Youm, 26 October 2010 
(http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/egypt’s-vegetable-crisis-how-revolutions-start). 
21 Interviews with academics and journalists carried out in Egypt, October 2010; “Workers, not voters, 
worry Egypt's government”, Al-Masry al-Youm, 23/11/2010 
(http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/workers-not-voters-worry-egypts-government); Mona el-Fiqi, 
“Not Even Minimum Wage”, Al-Ahram Weekly, 20-30 July 2008 
(http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/907/ec1.htm). 
22 Absolute poverty is calculated using the total poverty line and therefore consists of spending less than 
needed to cover absolutely minimal food and non-food needs. 
23 However, the poverty estimates and trends presented above are likely to be highly underestimated (see 
for example Sabry, 2009). 
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The Egyptian government attempted to mitigate the negative impact of rising prices and 
growing dissatisfaction among Egyptians by continuing to finance the country’s expensive food 
subsidy system and by raising civil servants’ salaries.24 However, while the increase in public 
spending spurred inflation, these measures proved insufficient to sustain the Egyptian people’s 
purchasing power. The food subsidy system is poorly targeted and reaches only a limited share 
of the real poor (World Bank, 2007), while the salary increases were insufficient to keep pace 
with rising inflation.25 The recent – and still ongoing – debate on the minimum wage was 
emblematic of gap between government’s proposals and public employees’ demands. For 
example, while, in November 2010, the National Wage Council raised the legal minimum wage 
to LE400 per month, teachers demanded a minimum wage of at least LE1200.26 
Deteriorating labour market conditions, particularly among young 
Over the last two decades, labour market problems, particularly among young educated 
Egyptians, also worsened dramatically. Although in the last ten years, total unemployment 
improved, youth unemployment among university graduates increased (from 9.7% in 1998 to 
14.4% in 2006) (Assaad, 2007). Moreover, persisting in the trend of the 1990s, most jobs 
created in the 1998-2006 period were in the informal economy, in which workers are poorly 
paid, lack social security coverage and work contracts, and, therefore, are more exposed to the 
risk of poverty (ibid.). The global crisis further exacerbated labour market challenges in Egypt. 
Employment growth slowed down, lay-offs increased and even total unemployment started to 
rise, albeit slightly (from 8.9% in 2007 to 9.4% in 2009).27 Youth, again, were particularly 
affected by the global crisis.28  
The economic policies undertaken by the Egyptian government had a very limited impact on job 
creation and, in many cases, worsened the employment situation. In fact, in spite of economic 
                                                     
24 See Abdelhamid and el-Baradei (2009); Wael Gamal, “Remembering the poor?”, Al-Ahram Weekly, 7-
13 July 2005 (http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/750/ec1.htm); Mona el-Fiqi, “Not Even Minimum 
Wage”, Al-Ahram Weekly, 20-30 July 2008 (http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/907/ec1.htm). 
25 In addition to the sources quoted above, see also Noha el-Hennawy, “School teachers form Egypt's and 
Independent Union”, al-Masry Al-Youm, 20/07/2010 (http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/school-
teachers-form-egypts-2nd-independent-union); “Education Ministry employees continue sit-in”, al-Masry 
Al-Youm, 27/06/2010 (http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/education-ministry-employees-continue-
sit). Mohamed Azouz, “Investors' federation calls for upping minimum wage to LE600/month”, al-Masry 
Al-Youm, 2/11/2010 (http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/investors-federation-calls-upping-
minimum-wage-le600month); Noha el-Hennawy, “School teachers form Egypt's and Independent 
Union”, al-Masry Al-Youm, 20/07/2010(http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/school-teachers-form-
egypts-2nd-independent-union). 
26 Mohamed Azouz, “Investors' federation calls for upping minimum wage to LE600/month”, al-Masry 
Al-Youm, 2/11/2010 (http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/investors-federation-calls-upping-
minimum-wage-le600month); Noha el-Hennawy, “School teachers form Egypt's and Independent 
Union”, al-Masry Al-Youm, 20/07/2010 (http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/school-teachers-form-
egypts-2nd-independent-union). 
27 CBE (2010), Center for Trade Union and Workers Services (2009), Abu Hatab (2009); “The War on 
Prices”, Al-Ahram Weekly, 26 March-1 April 2009( http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/940/ec54.htm); 
“Hard times ahead”, Al-Ahram Weekly, 12-18 March 2009 
(http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/938/ec3.htm); “Acting to save jobs”, al-Ahram Weekly, 24-30 
December 2009 (http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/978/ec1.htm). 
28 “Forget unemployment”, al-Ahram Weekly, 26 March-1 April 2009 
(http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/940/ec2.htm); “Acting to save jobs”, al-Ahram Weekly, 24-30 
December 2009 (http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/978/ec1.htm). 
EGYPT: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL TRANSITION | 9 
reforms, Egypt’s economic performance remained largely dependent on external factors and 
therefore unsustainable. The country’s economic boom during 2003-2008 was largely due to the 
boom in the global oil market, which benefited Arab oil exporting countries, resulting in higher 
FDI and remittances from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. By contrast, with the 
global financial crisis and the consequent decline in the fortunes of GCC countries, Egypt’s 
economic growth slowed down through declines in the major drivers of its economic success, 
namely exports, FDI, remittances and tourism revenues (Paciello, 2010; Radwan, 2009; Abu 
Hatab, 2009).  
Furthermore, in spite of the attempts at improving Egypt’s competitiveness, its export structure 
remained heavily dominated by natural resources and low-tech manufacturing exports, which 
provide very low quality jobs and limited opportunities for well-qualified young workers. In 
addition, FDI flowed to capital-intensive sectors that did not generate sufficient employment 
opportunities, and its large increase in recent years reflected privatisation, rather than new 
investment opportunities, that would have contributed to job creation (Alissa, 2007; El-
Megharbel, 2007). Economic reforms did not bring about an increase in private investment as 
initially expected. Thus, while the prospects of public sector employment declined significantly 
in recent years, employment opportunities in the formal private sector remained limited (UNDP, 
2010).  
The retrenchment of state welfare provision  
Over the last two decades, the state social welfare system in Egypt has gone through a serious 
crisis, which accelerated in the last years. While the government continued to be the main 
provider of education and health services, such services were no longer free and their quality 
worsened dramatically because public expenditure on social services declined.29 The 
retrenchment of the state’s welfare provision accelerated in recent years. Public expenditure on 
education and health services was cut. For example, public spending on education declined, 
from 19.5% in 2002 to 11.5% in 2006, as a percentage of total expenditure, and from 5.2% to 
4.0%, as a percentage of GDP (UNDP, 2008). Similarly, although total health expenditure as a 
percentage of public spending increased from 1.2% in 2001/2002 to 3.6% in 2008/2009, its 
share remained low relative to other countries of comparable income levels. Most of this 
spending went towards paying salaries, which, however, were insufficient to guarantee a 
dignified life for health sector workers (EIPR, 2009). Egyptian families increasingly incurred a 
wide range of private costs when they accessed public social services. Private out-of-pocket 
health spending, for example, increased faster than public spending, from 63% of total health 
expenditure in 2002, to 70% in 2008 (EIPR, 2009).30 Lastly, the dramatic deterioration in the 
quality of public education contributed to creating a generation of young Egyptians who are ill-
prepared for the job market. 
2.2 Rapid regression in the political sphere and the emergence of a spontaneous 
grassroots mobilisation 
Since 2005, the Egyptian regime increasingly tightened the political space and undermined the 
opposition to such an extent that, as Ottaway (2010) argued: “politically, Egypt has become a 
                                                     
29 For a review, see Galal (2003), UNDP (1998); Bayat (2006); Paciello (2007); Tadros (2006), Harrigan 
and el-Said (2009).  
30 For private costs in education, see Noha el-Hennawy, “School teachers form Egypt's 2nd independent 
union”, al-Masry al-Youm, 20/07/2010 (http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/fixing-egypt’s-schools-
we-need-compete); Gamal Essam El-Din, “Education ministers face down critics”, al-Ahram Weekly, 20-
30 December 2009 (http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/978/eg3.htm). 
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one-dimensional society where there is no true alternative to the present ruling establishment”. 
Combined with the dramatic deterioration of socio-economic conditions, political regression in 
the last five years, and especially last few months exasperated people’s frustration and 
resentment, particularly among the young. The murder of Khaled Saieed in June 2010, beaten 
by police forces before a crowd, revealed the brutality and arrogance of the regime and was 
followed by weeks of demonstrations against police use of force.31 According to Ashraf Khalil, 
this event helped to politicize untold numbers of Egyptians.32 
The regime’s politics of political exclusion culminated in the 2010 November elections, that led 
to a parliament where no real opposition was present.33 The perspective of a hereditary 
succession through Hosni Mubarak’s son Gamal or another candidature of H. Mubarak himself 
also contributed to frustrate any expectation for political change through formal channels. In 
this regard, the November elections definitively limited the pool of presidential candidates, 
insofar as only parties that won seats in parliament were eligible to nominate a presidential 
candidate for the next presidential elections, meaning that none of the opposition forces could 
run.34 A signal that many Egyptians had definitely lost confidence in formal channels of 
political expression was the low voter turnout at the 2010 November competition.35 
The economic and political situation discussed above contributed to exasperate Egyptians. The 
absence of viable large organised opposition forces and formal channels of political expression 
in a context of deteriorating socio-economic conditions proved unsustainable and people’s anger 
and frustration against the regime coalesced into spontaneous street protests. Organised political 
forces, including the largest opposition movement in the country, the MB,36 played no role in 
the early phase of mobilisation, adhering to the protests only a few days later, on occasion of the 
“Day of Anger”, on 28 January.  
While Egypt had been experiencing a wave of labour and social protests since 2005, a number 
of favourable factors transformed the protests of January-February 2011 into a real political 
challenge to the regime, leading to the overthrow of Mubarak. First, the Tunisian revolution was 
a key factor in triggering Egyptian protests, as Egyptian people, particularly the young, realised 
that overthrowing a dictator was possible and that state institutions were weaker than what they 
appeared (ICG, 2011, 2-3). Second, in the early phase of the revolution, thanks to social 
                                                     
31 Ashraf Khalil reports that Khaled was dragged from an internet café and assaulted by two plain-clothed 
police officers. The reasons for the aggression are still unclear, but Saieed’s family and friends claimed at 
the time that his murder was due to a posted video online showing police officers dividing up the spoils of 
a recent drug bust (Ashraf Khalil, “Dispatches From Tahrir: Inside Egypt’s revolution and the last days of 
Mubarak”, 3/03/2011 (http://www.rollingstoneme.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id 
=94). 
32 Ibid. The “We Are All Khaled Saieed” Facebook page became one of the main gathering points for the 
organisers of the protests that forced Mubarak to step down. 
33 This argument is made by many sources (ICG, 2011; Ashraf Khalil, “Dispatches From Tahrir: Inside 
Egypt’s revolution and the last days of Mubarak”, 3/03/2011 (http://www.rollingstoneme.com/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=94); Achcar, 2011. 
34 According to the 2006 and 2007 amendments, candidates for the presidency must either be leaders of a 
party represented in the parliament or receive the endorsement of a large number of lawmakers and 
members of the municipal councils, which, however, were under the control of the former ruling party. 
35 See “Egypt's November 28 parliamentary elections”, Arab Reform Bulletin, 30/11/2010 
(http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article=42032). 
36 For an interesting and complete analysis of the role of Muslim Brothers during the protests, see Husam 
Tammam and Patrick Haenni, “Egypt: Islam in the insurrection”, Religious Globe, 22/02/2011 
(http://religion.info/english/articles/article_519.shtml). 
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networking, young people with no political affiliation were instrumental in calling for the first 
mass protest of 25 January and organising an unprecedented mobilisation rallying half-million 
people for that day.37 Once protests began, however, the revolution rapidly extended to a broad 
range of people, including many who did not have Internet access at home (Lindsey, 2011). 
Third, unlike previous social protests in Egypt,38 the mass mobilisation of January-February 
2011 immediately linked socioeconomic grievances to political demands, asking for the 
resignation of H. Mubarak,39 and involved diverse social, religious, political and generational 
constituencies. The concessions made by Mubarak, which would have been considered as 
inconceivable earlier before the start of the protests, arrived too late and were unsatisfactory.  
Finally, the military also played a role in the Egyptian revolution, but in a different way, as 
compared to the military in Tunisia. The Egyptian military was ambivalent: it did not act against 
the protesters, but, contrary to what happened in Tunisia, it did not side with them either and, in 
many cases, did not intervene to stop the violence by pro-Mubarak supporters against protesters. 
However, when it became clear that Mubarak’s tactics had failed, the military started to 
pressure Mubarak to step down, eventually forcing his resignation. While the army in Tunisia 
had little loyalty to Ben Ali and no economic interest in maintaining his regime, the Egyptian 
military was an integral part of the political and economic system set up by Mubarak.40 
3. The Challenges Ahead  
On 11 February 2011, Hosni Mubarak stepped down after thirty years in power and the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, led by Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, the 
country’s defence minister, took on the temporary rule of the country, with the aim to 
administer its affairs until parliamentary elections are held and a new president is elected. While 
street protests in Egypt continue, the direction of the country’s political transition is still unclear 
and the prospects for real political change appear particularly bleak. The sections below 
highlight the main challenges that are likely to influence Egypt’s trajectory as well as to hamper 
the country’s democratic transition towards a sustainable steady-state.  
3.1 The limits of transition: The Military Council and the interim government 
The Military Council has been governing the country since revolution ousted President Hosni 
Mubarak on 11 February. Although the military enjoys a relatively high level of credibility 
among many Egyptians and it has been trying to put on a civilian façade in the administration of 
the country, the extent of its commitment to real political change is unclear and ambiguous. 
                                                     
37 See Lindsey (Feb. 2011); Amr Hamzawy, “Egypt's Bread and Butter Issues”, The New York Times, 
27/01/2011 (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=42393). ICG 
(2011) reports that, although the regime decided to stop telecommunication connectivity in January, this 
did not prevent the protests going on because once they began, people continued to meet in Tahrir.  
38 The protests which had started in the early 2000s were important in preparing the ground for the 25 
January revolution. As the journalist Hossam el-Hamalawy argues “The uprising that started on 25 
January 2011 was the result of a long process in which the wall of fear fell, bit by bit”, (Hossam el-
Hamalawy, “Egypt's revolution has been 10 years in the making”, The Guardian, 2/02/2011 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/02/egypt-revolution-mubarak-wall-of-fear). 
39 Amr Hamzawy, “Egypt's Bread and Butter Issues”, The New York Times, 27/01/2011 
(http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=42393). 
40 Clement M. Henry and Robert Springborg, “Why Egypt's Military Will Not Be Able to Govern”, 
Foreign Affairs, 2/02/2011 (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67475/clement-m-henry-and-robert-
springborg/a-tunisian-solution-for-egypts-military). 
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According to Samer Soliman,41 what is at stake in the current process of transition is “the extent 
of change”.42 While the military will certainly fulfil its promises for elections and the transfer of 
power to a civilian government,43 the political transformation it has in mind is likely to differ 
considerably from the one that protesters in Tahrir Square aspire to. This is due to the fact that 
the Supreme Military Council is drawn from men who supported Mubarak’s regime until his 
departure and have little interest in giving up their economic and political powers.44  
Since the Council aims to restore stability very rapidly and wants to preserve its interests,45 it 
has made very little effort so far to discard the old system of power, which continues to 
permeate all major institutions (local governorates, the administration, the judiciary, the media 
and so on). A case in point is that the government nominated by H. Mubarak on 31 January 
2011, and therefore formed by Mubarak loyalists, was kept in place until 22 February. Although 
the interim government was then reshuffled, Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq, who was appointed 
by Mubarak shortly before he stepped down, remained in office until 3 March, when, following 
a wave of protests, he was forced to resign. The new cabinet, formed on 7 March and headed by 
Essam Sharaf,46 has been accepted by opposition forces and Egyptians in general. However, 
even if those too close to Mubarak were removed from government, there is no reason to expect 
a profound change until decision-making remains firmly in the hands of the military and the 
interim government continues to include ministers who served under Mubarak or had strong ties 
with the previous regime. In the same way, most of the new governors appointed by the Military 
Council on 14 April 2011 were chosen from the military and the police.47  
Moreover, the Council has managed this early phase of transition through a top-down approach, 
signalling the limited potential for genuine change under the interim authorities. Although the 
army has created a Facebook page to communicate its actions, transparency and consensus-
building have certainly not characterised the Council’s decision-making.48 The constitution, for 
example, is to be reformed with no involvement of political forces and no space for public 
                                                     
41 Professor of Political Science at the American University of Cairo. 
42Neil MacFarquhar, “Egypt’s Generals Struggle in New Role”, The New York Times, 3/03/2011 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/world/middleeast/04egypt.html?_r=1). 
43 Many argue that there is no risk that the military will not relinquish power after elections. See Ahmed 
Zaki Osman, “Powerhouse and powerbrokers: A profile of Egypt's military”, alMasry alYoum, 
16/02/2011 (http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/320687), Amr Abdulrahman, “Why fear the 
military?”, alMasry alYoum, 17/02/2011 (http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/321282). 
44 See Amr Abdulrahman, “Why fear the military?”, alMasry alYoum, 17/02/2011.  
(http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/321282). Jeffrey White, “Egypt's Military in Power: Dynamics, 
Challenges, Prospects”, Policy Watch, 22/02/2011 (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ 
templateC05.php?CID=3310).  
45 Neil MacFarquhar, “Egypt’s Generals Struggle in New Role”, The New York Times, 3/03/2011 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/world/middleeast/04egypt.html?_r=1); Amr Abdulrahman, “Why 
fear the military?”, alMasry alYoum, 17/02/2011 (http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/321282). 
46 Essam Sharaf is a former transport minister who is said to have stepped down from his post several 
years ago because of disagreements with Mubarak, giving him credibility today. He went to speak to 
protesters in Tahrir Square during the revolution. 
47 “New governors appointed by the old Mubarak method”, al Masry al Youm, 14/04/2011 
(http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/400373). 
48 Nathan J. Brown, “The Struggle to Define the Egyptian Revolution”, Foreign Policy, 17/02/2011 
(http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=42670); Marwan Muasher, 
Marina Ottaway, Michele Dunne, Amr Hamzawy, “After Mubarak”, Carnegie Endowment, 16/02/2011 
(http://carnegie-mec.org/events/?fa=3166).  
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debate. Even though many notable jurists were appointed to the constitutional committee to 
draft the amendments, the Supreme Council nominated the committee without consultation with 
other political forces and without clarifying the criteria for selecting its members.49 Tahani al-
Gebali, Egypt’s first female judge and vice president of the Supreme Constitutional Court, 
denounces, for example, that the Military Council did not give the Supreme Constitutional 
Court any chance to comment on the amendments.50 Women also lamented the fact that none of 
their representatives were appointed to the committee. In addition, while the constitutional 
proposal was presented by the committee on 26 February, the Referendum that approved it was 
held on 19 March, leaving very little space for public debate and for any campaigning (see 
below for details on constitutional reform). Yet, although Egyptians were called to approve 
constitutional amendments in the Referendum, two weeks later, the Military Council issued a 
constitutional declaration including additional articles not mentioned in the Referendum and 
replacing Egypt’s 1971 Constitution, without consultation with political and civil society 
groups.51 Similarly, the New Political Parties Law, amending Law 40 of 1977 and issued by the 
Military Council at the end of March 2011, was drafted by an unrepresentative committee 
without any public debate or consultation.  
Furthermore, the Military Council has so far made very limited and hesitant political 
concessions to the revolution. For example, it has not addressed protesters’ demands such as the 
sudden end of the emergency law,52 the immediate release of all political prisoners and the 
issuing of a general amnesty. No systematic investigation has started regarding those 
responsible for killing protesters during the upheaval, while many are still missing.53 In 
addition, although, to circumscribe the monopoly of the military and to allow for a more 
inclusive transition, several political forces have proposed to include civilians in the transitional 
council, nonetheless this proposal has gone unheard.54 Also the decision by the interim 
authorities to replace a number of heads of state media, who were appointed under Mubarak’s 
                                                     
49 “ElBaradei criticizes Egypt's military rulers”, al Masry al Youm, 17/02/2011, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/321820; Marwan Muasher, Marina Ottaway, Michele Dunne, 
Amr Hamzawy, “After Mubarak”, Carnegie Endowment, 16/02/2011 (http://carnegie-
mec.org/events/?fa=3166).  
50 She notes that “These modifications were presented as if they were a sacred book that should not be 
discussed. However, drafting a constitutional text is a political process in the first place. It should not be 
handled exclusively by a group of technocrats or legal experts” (Noha El-Hennawy, “Q&A with Tahani 
al-Gebali: Say "no" to constitutional amendments, alMasry alYom, 10/03/2011” 
(http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/347797). 
51 Nathan J. Brown, Kristen Stilt, “A Haphazard Constitutional Compromise”, Commentary, Carnegie 
Endowment, 11/04/2011 (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=43533#). 
52 On 28 March, the Council of the Armed Forces announced that the emergency law will be lifted before 
parliamentary elections.  
53 An independent committee, formed by volunteer judges, activists and law experts, was formed after the 
so called “Battle of Camel” with the task of investigating on the violence against protesters during the 18-
day uprising (see Mohamed Abdel-Baky, “Blood on their hands”, Al-Ahram Weekly, 21-27 April 2011 
(www.weekly.ahram.org). 
54 This proposal, for example, was made by M. ElBaradei, a few days the inception of the Council 
(“ElBaradei criticizes Egypt's military rulers”, alMasry alYoum, 17/02/2011 
(http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/321820), by youth groups (“Back to the table”, al-Ahram 
Weekly, 3-9 March 2011 (http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1037/eg33.htm) and by other civil society 
organisations (“Press release: From civil society organisations”, 1/03/2011 
(www,cihrs.org/English/newssystem/details.aspx?id=2769). 
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regime, arrived late, at the end of March,55 and has not altered much the situation, as most have 
been substituted by key figures within these institutions under the previous regime.56 Only in 
mid-April 2011, the Military Council started to address a number of key requests made by 
protesters, in an attempt to placate street demonstrations. Mubarak and his sons, Gamal and 
Alaa, were arrested on 12 April,57 while investigations on a number of men close to Mubarak 
have intensified.58 The former ruling party, the NDP, which had continued to function in the 
post-Mubarak era,59 was also dissolved on 15 April.  
As street protests continue at the time of writing in mid-April 2011, the military’s response to 
demonstrations has become more and more intransigent through a greater use of force, arrests 
and human rights violations.60 The most violent episodes occurred on 9 March in Tahrir Square, 
when protesters were arrested, tortured and prosecuted in military courts,61 and, on 9 April, 
when a large protest in Tahrir Square was dispersed through force, causing the death of one 
person. Moreover, on 24 March, in response to growing labour unrest, the interim government 
approved a draft law that punishes anyone organising, inciting or participating in protests that 
                                                     
55 Mohamed Elmeshad, “Thursday’s papers: Interim constitution and shake-up of state media”, al Masry 
al Youm, 31/03/2011 (http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/381350). 
56 Ursula Lindsey, “State media clean-up?”, The Arabist, 3/04/2011 
(http://www.arabist.net/blog/2011/4/3/state-media-clean-up.html). 
57 At the time of writing, Mubarak is being detained at the Sharm el-Sheikh International Hospital owing 
to unclear health problems.  
58 Mubarak’s chief of staff Zakaria Azmy and former Housing Minister Ibrahim Suleiman were sent to 
jail pending further investigation; Safwat El Sherif, the former Shura Council speaker, was put under 
investigation (see “Egypt ministers face corruption charges”, al Jazeera, 17/04/2011 
(http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/04/201141715562214192.html). 
59 The NDP, for example, asked it members to approve the proposed constitutional amendments, put to 
referendum on 19 March. (“NDP calls on members to vote in favour of constitutional amendments”, 
alMasry alYoum, 13/03/2011, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/351392). Also see Virginie 
Collombier, “Can Egypt's National Democratic Party be reformed again”, Foreign Policy, 09/03/2011 
(http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/09/can_egypt_s_national_democratic_party_be_reforme
d_again). 
60 The Egyptian army used force to disperse activists gathered in Cairo’s Tahrir Square to demand the 
removal of Hosni Mubarak loyalists from the interim cabinet on 28 February. Similarly, on 4 March, 
soldiers fired in the air and used stun guns to disperse hundreds of protesters who attempted to enter the 
state security offices inside the Ministry of the Interior in downtown Cairo. The same day, military police 
clashed with more than 300 protesters near the prime minister's office. On 23 March, the military used 
sticks and Tasers against students demanding the resignation of deans associated with the Mubarak 
regime at Cairo University. For recent clashes between workers and the army at Shebin El-Kom Textile 
Company, see Dina Samak, “Army uses force to end textile workers strike, withdraws from factory”, 
Ahram online, 7/04/2011 (http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/9545/Egypt/Politics-/Army-
uses-force-to-end-textile-workers-strike,-wit.aspx). For recent clashes between students and security 
forces, see  “Cairo university students clash with security personnel”, al Masry al Youm, 22/04/2011. 
61 Amnesty International reports that at least 18 women were held in military detention and were forced to 
have ‘virginity tests’ and threatened with prostitution charges (Amnesty International, “Egyptian Women 
Protesters Forced To Take Virginity Tests”, 23/03/2011 (http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-
updates/egyptian-women-protesters-forced-take-‘virginity-tests’-2011-03-23). See also HRW, “Egypt: End 
Torture, Military Trials of Civilians Demonstrators and Journalists Arrested, Abused as Army Clears Tahrir 
Square”, 11/03/2011 (http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/03/11/egypt-end-torture-military-trials-
civilians). 
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damage the economy by imprisonment for at least one year or/and paying fine.62 A few weeks 
later, in spite of strong criticism, the draft law was ratified by the Military Council. Also the 
recent arrest of a blogger,63 who criticised the military of continuing the repressive methods of 
the previous regime, as well as the Military Council’s demand that local editors do not publish 
any information regarding the Armed Forces without first consulting with them, point to 
worrying impediments to press freedom in Egypt.64 These facts signal the risk of a return to the 
repressive methods used during Mubarak’s era. 
Finally, re-emerging sectarian tensions can pose further problems to Egypt’s political transition, 
increasing chaos, divisions and political instability. In spite of the signs of rapprochement 
during the popular uprising against Mubarak, tensions between Copts and Muslims have 
reappeared,65 while increasing acts of intolerance apparently carried out by Salafist groups 
against Sufi and Copts have been reported in the March-April 2011.66 Interim authorities have 
been both ambivalent and incapable in coping with these problems,67 which may result in 
exacerbating sectarian divisions. Demonstrations and sit-ins by Copts have been violently 
repressed by the army, while the intolerant acts carried out by Salafist groups have not received 
any response by the interim authorities; the constitutional referendum gave rise to 
unprecedented polarization between Islamists and Copts, with the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Salafist groups supporting the constitutional amendments endorsed by the military, while the 
Coptic Church calling for an entirely new Constitution.68 
                                                     
62 See “The 3rd  meet ing of  the Cabinet  of  Minis ters” ,  23/03/2011 
(http://cabinet.gov.eg/Media/NewsDetails.aspx?id=2260). 
63 The Egyptian blogger Maikel Nabil Sanad was arrested on 28 March 2011 (Freedom Alert, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=581&alert=48). 
64 See Committee to Protect Journalists, “Substantial setback for press freedom in Egypt”, 13/04/2011 
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Ahram Online, 18/03/2011 (http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/7803/Egypt/Copts-fear-Islamic-
state-and-say-‘No’-to-constitut.aspx); “Army violently disperses new Copts' protest”, Ahram online, 
16/03/2011 (http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/7807/Egypt/Politics-/Army-violently-
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3.2 Restoring public security  
Beyond the Council, another major challenge to Egypt’s political transition is posed by the 
persistent lack of security since the onset of the protests against Mubarak. Although, at the time 
of writing, the security situation has improved compared to February-March 2011, it remains 
fragile and unpredictable. In addition to rising episodes of religious intolerance, common 
criminality continues to be widespread,69 while thugs or groups who are said to be connected to 
the former-ruling party and the security apparatus, continue to foment tensions and attack 
protesters.70 This persistent state of insecurity reflects two main problems: a lack of law 
enforcement, owing to the police’s reluctance to return on the streets, fearing people’s 
hostility;71 and a lack of reform of the powerful security apparatus in place under Mubarak.  
The interim government has been completely silent on these problems until the last reshuffle, 
while the Military Council has approached the issue of security by simply attempting to stop 
demonstrations, ignoring instead reports of arbitrary arrests and torture by security forces. 
Under the first two interim-governments, the only concrete actions taken were the beginning of 
investigations into a number of Interior Ministry officials, accused of ordering the use of force 
against protesters during the 18 days of demonstrations.72 The new cabinet took an important 
step toward the right direction, announcing the dissolution of the State Security Investigation 
Service (SSI) on 15 March 2011. One major problem now is the reconstruction of the security 
apparatus to make it responsive to citizens’ needs and accountable to the rule of law. While a 
real reform of the security apparatus will take a long time,73 if and how, in the phase of political 
transition, the Military Council will pursue this goal is open to question. Thus far, the 
restructuring of the security apparatus appears to be more cosmetic than real: the SSI was 
renamed the National Security Agency and many of those working at the SSI have been simply 
moved to the new Agency.74  
Restoring public order and ensuring citizens’ security are necessary preconditions for Egypt’s 
political transition and the conduct of free and fair elections. Moreover, the persistent state of 
insecurity in the streets and the spread of religious intolerance may increasingly favour counter-
revolutionary attitudes among citizens, working in favour of those seeking to keep the old 
regime in place. In addition, the incapacity, or unwillingness, of transition authorities to clearly 
restore the rule of law and particularly to reform the security apparatus exposes the country to 
rising resentments, confusions and tensions among Egyptians. The re-emerging tensions 
between Copts and Muslims are a case in point. The recent clashes between Copts and Muslims 
are reported by some to have been instigated by the state security forces in order to distract 
activists who were demanding the dismantling of the security apparatus and to compromise 
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political change.75 While these claims need to be proved, they are nonetheless indicative of the 
risk posed to political transition if public security and trust in public authorities, and in the rule 
of law, are not restored soon. Yet, re-emerging sectarian tensions could be exploited by the 
interim authorities as an excuse to keep the emergency law and justify the return to repressive 
methods in order to restore security. 
3.3 Constitutional reform 
A third set of challenges regards the constitutional reforms. When the Supreme Military Council 
took power, it suspended the constitution and appointed a ten-member Committee with the sole 
task of amending eight articles and cancelling a ninth article of the constitution that restrict civil 
liberties.76 Just a few days after its establishment, on 26 February 2011, the Committee 
presented the proposed constitutional changes and, on 19 March, 77% of Egyptians approved 
them in a popular referendum. The referendum saw an unprecedented turnout, 18 millions of 
people out of 45 millions eligible voters. 
Nevertheless, the approval of the amendments raises concern with regard to the direction of 
political transition in Egypt as it could undermine the chances to break with the old system of 
power. One major problem lies in the fact that, as said above, the process of constitutional 
reform was imposed from above, with no national dialogue and no time for campaigning, thus 
preventing a shared and inclusive political transition. For this, many in Egypt, including 
politicians, judges and experts, rejected the proposed amendments,77 calling instead for opening 
a broad national dialogue over the constitutional reform and eventually electing a constitutional 
commission/assembly by the people to rewrite the constitution before parliamentary and 
presidential elections.78  
Regarding the amendments themselves, the proposed constitutional revisions have undoubtedly 
introduced some positive changes regarding the election of future president: they limit 
presidential terms to two consecutive four-year periods, expand eligibility criteria, restore 
judicial supervision of elections, make it complicated for a president to maintain the state of 
emergency,79 and require the president to appoint a vice president within 60 days of taking 
office. However, the eligibility criteria for presidential nominations continue to be too 
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restrictive: the candidate must be endorsed by 30 members from the People’s Assembly or the 
Shura Council, collect 30,000 signatures from 15 governorates, or be a member of a party that 
holds at least one seat in parliament. Moreover, the Committee introduced a rule that 
disqualifies any Egyptian who has dual nationality or is married to a non-Egyptian from 
running, eventually excluding a large number of expatriates.80 In addition, despite these 
amendments, the 1971 Constitution cannot ensure a real transition to democracy. As Amr 
Hamzawy notes, “the 1971 Constitution supports an authoritarian system of government that 
gives too much control to the president, violates the powers of the legislative and judicial 
branches, and suspends citizens’ liberties and rights. It is therefore unsuitable for managing a 
safe transition to democracy, which requires a parliamentary constitution and balanced powers 
among all three branches of government, along with strong mechanisms of inter-branch 
oversight and accountability”.81 As a result, as the political forces opposing the constitutional 
amendments argue, holding parliamentary and presidential elections under the current 
constitution could lead to a presidential system that is not so dissimilar from the one in place 
under Mubarak’s regime.  
Yet, according to the amendments, the new parliament and president are obliged to elect a 
commission of 100 members to draft a new Constitution within six months from the time 
parliamentarians are elected, after which the document will be subject to a popular referendum. 
However, the modalities to elect this commission remain unclear. Whether or not the members 
of the commission will be taken from the parliament itself or from a large spectrum of political 
and social forces outside the parliament is a crucial issue. Moreover, should the new parliament 
not be representative enough, the chances for an inclusive and acceptable process of 
constitutional reform are limited (see below). 
The interim Constitution issued by the Military Council at the end of March mostly includes 
provisions from the 1971 Constitution, thus leaving the above-mentioned problems unsolved. In 
addition to incorporate the nine amendments approved in the last Referendum, the constitutional 
declaration, which is made of 62 articles,82 preserves controversial provisions such as the one 
stating that half of the parliamentary seats have to be reserved to representatives of workers and 
peasants. According to some criticisms, this could advantage well established political forces 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood’s party and political groups tied to the former ruling party as 
well as it could distort the composition of the future Parliament.83 Yet, while including many 
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articles from the 1971 Constitution, the constitutional declaration also discards many others, 
thus omitting important details and suffering from significant lacunae that add further confusion 
and ambiguity to Egypt’s political transition.84  
A major related factor regards the reform of the electoral system and laws governing political 
parties. The amendments to the Law governing the establishment and operation of political 
parties do not introduce substantial changes and may favour well-established parties. For 
example, the new law requires that any new political party must have at least 5000 members 
across ten governorates in order to be registered, whereas under Mubarak, they needed only 
1000 members.85 This provision is likely to disadvantage emerging political groups that may not 
have time to recruit so many members across all governorates.  
3.4 The role of political and other civil society groups 
The pace and extent of political change in Egypt will very much depend on the capacity of 
political and civil society forces to take active part in the transition process and bargain with the 
Military Council and future public authorities. However, most of the existing political and other 
civil society forces in Egypt are very weak. They lack experience and a clear strategic political 
and economic agenda to be proposed as an alternative to the Military Council. In spite of the 
cohesion reached during the protests against Mubarak, political and civil society groups are also 
very fragmented and have been unable so far to elaborate a common platform.86 These 
problems, and particularly the lack of a coherent unified front, have profoundly affected their 
ability to negotiate with the military, which, as said above, has made only marginal and belated 
political concessions aimed at containing street protests.  
Moreover, if, as announced by the Military Council, parliamentary elections are held in 
September 2011, followed by presidential elections at the end of the year,87 many political 
forces, especially those which emerged during the protests, will not have enough time to 
develop, organise their structures and mobilise support. This concern is now shared by many 
political and civil society actors that are demanding to extend the transitional phase at least for 
12 months.88 By contrast, regime loyalists and the MB are likely to gain the most from early 
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elections. The former ruling party and the MB were indeed the only political forces to support 
the referendum. 
Given such a tight timeframe, there is the risk that the new parliament will only include a 
narrow spectrum of political forces, namely the Muslim Brothers and Mubarak regime 
loyalists.89 With regard to the latter, the dismantlement of the NDP will not be sufficient to 
weaken the past power system or prevent members of the former ruling party from taking part 
in future elections under new political formations, given their extensive alliances.90 This will 
have serious implications for the direction of political transition. If the upcoming parliament is 
dominated by a limited number of forces, this means that, as anticipated above, the new 
constitution as well as future political and economic reforms will be elaborated by a restricted 
number of people according to their specific interests.91  
In this gloomy context, many people, particularly the youth, increasingly feel that the spirit of 
the revolution has been lost in the name of stability and that the new parliament could be 
insufficiently representative. Hence, street protests have regained momentum, on Friday 1 April, 
and, particularly on 8 April. In this phase of political transition, street protests may play an 
important role in influencing the pace and direction of political events. However, they may also 
amplify divisions among political and civil society groups, namely between those calling for an 
open confrontation with the Military Council through continuing demonstrations and those 
opting for greater accommodation.92 Trying to go beyond street demonstrations, a number of 
youth groups have started to upgrade their strategies, preparing also for the next elections. The 
Youth Revolution Coalition (YRC), for example, has decided to prepare a list of hundreds of 
candidates across the country that they will support in next parliamentary elections.93 Similarly, 
another coalition of twenty-three political groups,94 including numerous youth movements, has 
been formed with the aim to influence future elections by creating a list of candidates to back 
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and a central office to coordinate their campaign and political demands.95 Moreover, the April 6 
Youth Movement has recently announced that it will form a non-governmental organisation in 
order to play a more influential political role.96  
3.5 The role of the Muslim Brothers 
The Muslim Brothers are expected to play a role in the political transition in view of their large 
constituency and well-organised structure. Their full inclusion into Egyptian political life is an 
indispensable step toward a real democratic transition in Egypt. As Carrie Rosefsky Wickham 
underlines, “The Brotherhood has demonstrated that it is capable of evolving over time and the 
best way to strengthen its democratic commitments is to include it in the political process, 
making sure there are checks and balances in place to ensure that no group can monopolize state 
power and that all citizens are guaranteed certain freedoms under the law”.97 Moreover, the non-
inclusion of the Brotherhood or other moderate Islamist groups into political life could 
strengthen the most violent and intolerant Islamist groups, namely the Salafists. 
However, the precise role of the Muslim Brothers in the post-Mubarak transition remains to be 
seen. The MB still has to elaborate a clear strategy vis-à-vis the changed political context. On 
various occasions, the Muslim Brothers have reiterated that “they do not intend to take a 
dominant role in the forthcoming political transition” and that they will not nominate any of 
members to run in the upcoming presidential election.98 Meanwhile, they have announced the 
creation of a political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, whose platform, however, is still 
unknown. As for their relations with the Supreme Council, the MB, which would benefit from 
quick elections, appears to be in favour of the discrete and rapid transition endorsed by the 
army. In the words of Gilbert Achcar (2011): “a newly respectable Muslim Brotherhood, 
supportive of the army, is emerging”. In this regard, the military appointed a member of the 
MB, Sobhi Saleh, lawyer and former member of parliament, to the Constitutional Committee, 
while the Brotherhood expressed its official support for the amendments.  
Another issue to be considered is that the MB is a large organisation, with many different and 
conflicting positions within it. Much of the future role of the MB will likely depend on whether 
and how these divergences will be harmonised. The so-called conservative wing, which is 
influenced by Salafi thinking and is more interested in prioritising social and religious education 
than engaging in political life, has been dominant in the movement, especially after the election 
of the General Guide in late 2009.99 By contrast, the so-called reformist wing, more committed 
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to political dialogue with other forces and to democratising their ideology, has been 
marginalised.100 After the revolution, divisions inside the movement have been emerging 
strongly, particularly between the young generation that participated in the revolution and the 
old guard. Young members within the group have questioned its internal democracy, calling for 
dissolving the Guidance Bureau and Shura Council, and demanding free and fair elections for 
the group’s leadership.101 Now that the movement, which includes contradictory schools of 
Islamic thought ranging from Salafi fundamentalism to liberal Islamism, is elaborating a 
political platform for the new party, internal differences are likely to come to the fore.102 In the 
process of revising their platform, for example, the MB appears internally divided over whether 
women and Copts should be allowed to run for president.103 While these divergences could 
trigger organisational and ideological reforms within the MB, they could also lead the reformists 
to establish their own Islamist political party or to join ranks with the moderate Islamist al-
Wasat party.104  
In addition, the MB’s capacity to mobilise the largest popular support in the post-revolutionary 
period should not be taken for granted. First, in a context of political pluralism, the MB will 
have to compete with new opposition forces, eventually including different Islamist parties, 
which could undermine its political hegemony.105 For example, al-Wasat party, which was 
created by a number of young Brothers in 1996 to offer a reformist version of political Islam, 
finally obtained its legalisation in the post-Mubarak period, on 19 February.106 Second, in the 
post-revolutionary period, the popularity of the MB and its credibility may be undermined by a 
number of factors: the movement was part of the past system of power; it played no role in 
triggering the uprising; and the revolution was inspired by young Egyptians who were not 
ideologically, let alone religiously driven.107 Third, as Pioppi (2011) argues, the MB’s capacity 
to mobilise large support through its provision of social services should not be overemphasised, 
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as today the Brotherhood-related social activities are extremely reduced.  
3.6 Socio-economic problems 
The Egyptian economy, particularly foreign investment, construction and tourism, has been 
inevitably affected by the revolution, although definitive estimates of the impact are not 
available yet. About 210,000 tourists left Egypt at the end of January 2011, which meant that 
tourism revenues plummeted by $178 million (roughly LE1 billion) that week, while in 
February, tourist reservations were cancelled, amounting to losses of $825 million (LE4.8 
billion).108 Income from the Suez Canal has dropped by 1.6% since the start of the revolution,109 
while foreign direct investment is expected to decrease by over 40% in 2011.110 As a result, 
growth projections for 2011 have been revised from 5% to 2%.111 Moreover, the Egyptian stock 
exchange resumed its activities on 23 March, after its reopening had been postponed three times 
from the start of the revolution, fearing that investors could flee the country.112  
Recent political events have exacerbated previous socio-economic problems: the employment 
implications of the current economic crisis are likely to be dramatic, if we think that the tourism 
sector employs more than 2.5 million Egyptians.113 Tourism localities are still empty114 and, 
unless security is restored on the streets, the tourism industry will not return to normality. 
Workers’ strikes, demanding better wages, have been ongoing, despite the military rulers 
prohibited demonstrations and warned workers that labour unrest threatened national security 
and that the strikes must stop.115 The dramatic events in Libya have compounded Egypt’s 
economic woes, in view of the loss of remittances and the thousands of returnees who will 
aggravate the labour market situation. At the time of writing, for example, between 120,000 to 
140,000 Egyptians have returned from Libya.116  
Egypt now faces a double problem: coping with the negative effects of the current economic 
crisis resulting from the revolution and dealing with the structural socio-economic problems, 
which were left unaddressed under Mubarak’s regime, and contributed to its demise. The 
Military Council and the interim government have devoted so far almost no attention to socio-
economic problems, apart from announcing the usual measures that Mubarak himself used to 
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promise to calm people’s discontent, namely rises in government salaries and protecting food 
subsidies,117 and exceptional measures, including the allocation of LE100 million to enable the 
employment of Egyptians returning from Libya,118 pay unemployment subsidies for people who 
prove to have lost their jobs as a result of the revolution,119 and the creation of a bank account to 
support the Egyptian economy with donations.120 However, while these measures may be 
unavoidable in this early phase of political transition, current and future governments should not 
forget that, under Mubarak, they proved ineffective to respond to Egypt’s socio-economic 
problems. In order to seriously address its main socio-economic challenges, Egypt needs to 
radically rethink and reform its economic and social reform agenda with a view to diversifying 
its productive structure diminishing its vulnerability to external shocks; redirecting economic 
policy to create more and better quality jobs so as to satisfy the growing supply of educated 
youth and reduce regional and income disparities; reforming its social welfare system (e.g. 
health security system, food subsidy system, education system, etc) extending the coverage of 
public social services; and investing in education and training so as to train young people to 
meet the demands of the labour market. Unless social and economic policies in Egypt are 
reformed in this direction, the deterioration of the socio-economic conditions is expected to 
continue. 
A profound structural change of the Egyptian economy requires above all a deep restructuring 
of the country’s political economy, which is necessary to deal with widespread corruption and 
allow an independent private sector to emerge. The prosecution of a few businessmen with close 
links to Mubarak’s political establishment may not suffice to discard business cronies and 
corruption. While a deep restructuring of the country’s political economy requires a long time, it 
will depend on whether and how political transition proceeds. The military, which so far has 
exercised widespread control over the Egyptian economy and now also directly controls 
politics, will probably refrain from adopting the economic measures needed for a more 
transparent business sector.121 Among others, the army may oppose changes in the restrictive 
laws that regulate trade union activities inside military industrial and commercial firms.122  
Moreover, because the elaboration of an inclusive agenda requires the involvement of a broad 
spectrum of political and social forces, the latter need to elaborate clear economic programmes 
to be able to negotiate with the interim authorities and, in a post interim phase, propose effective 
solutions to Egypt’s socio-economic problems.123 While political forces need time to develop 
adequate expertise on socio-economic issues, a positive step is that Egypt’s first post-1957 
independent trade union federation was established on 3 March, and, across the country, a 
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number of workers are organizing their own independent associations.124 However, there is the 
risk that, in the next months, all political forces will concentrate their efforts on political 
matters, while marginalising socio-economic questions.  
Finally, fiscal problems may constrain the capacity of current and future Egyptian governments 
to deal seriously with the country’s socio-economic challenges. Despite some progress in the 
last decade, Egypt suffers from a high budget deficit and large public debt ratios. The current 
crisis has worsened fiscal problems as government’s revenues have dropped owing to the 
collapse in tourism and foreign investment. The decline in remittances associated with Egyptian 
migrants escaping from Libya, along with rising salaries, and oil and food prices, which will 
translate into higher subsidy bills, will put high pressure on the budget’s deficit. Egypt could 
partially cope with these problems by recurring to external aid, but this will entail a limited 
margin of manoeuvre for the Egyptian government in choosing its future economic policies. For 
example, under a possible intervention by the IMF and the WB, Egypt would be pressed to 
contain its expansionary policies, by cutting public expenditure, and particularly eliminating 
food subsidies, privatising the health insurance system and retrenching the wage bill. If 
implemented, these measures could further damage Egypt’s socio-economic conditions. 
4. Possible scenarios for the future 
While the direction of Egypt’s political transition is still unpredictable, in the long run, moving 
towards a new equilibrium of state sustainability will be conditional on whether and to what 
extent, Egypt will be able to marginalise the old power system.  
In the early phase of transition, a number of factors could make the old power system 
particularly resilient, setting up the stage for the worst case scenario, which consists in either an 
authoritarian involution or a limited, unfinished, political transformation. The interim phase is 
managed and controlled by the military, which wants a rapid but circumscribed political 
transition, reflecting their strong economic and political ties with the previous regime; most 
political forces and civil society groups, particularly emerging ones, are still weak and would 
need time and resources to develop in order to be able to counterbalance anti-revolutionary 
pressures; lack of public security and radical constitutional reform may hamper transparent and 
inclusive elections over the next months; and the dramatic socio-economic situation, if not 
adequately addressed, may inhibit the process of political transition, aggravating discontent and 
instability.  
If, in the next months preceding the parliamentary elections, the Military Council continues to 
conduct the interim phase as it has so far done, namely through a top-down and opaque 
approach, the old power system will remain intact. Any commitment by the Military Council to 
reform the security apparatus, the media or the judicial system before elections is likely to be 
merely cosmetic or insufficient. In so far as these key institutions fail to be deeply restructured, 
supporters of the old regime will continue to be strategically placed to influence the trajectory of 
political events, including upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections.  
If, as expected, parliamentary elections are held in September 2011, followed by presidential 
elections at the end of the year, most political forces, especially those which emerged during the 
revolution, are unlikely to organise and mobilise support given the tight timeframe and their 
lack of internal cohesion. In turn, the new parliament is likely to include only a narrow spectrum 
of political forces, namely the Muslim Brothers and regime loyalists, who may hide under new 
guises. In this event, the new constitution will be drafted by a restricted number of people 
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according to their specific interests, which may reflect those of the old power system. So, there 
is the risk that both the parliament and the new constitution will not be accountable to many 
Egyptians, particularly the new political and social forces which emerged from the revolution. A 
parliament that fails to integrate the main actors of the revolution, particularly the young and 
women, will enjoy scarce legitimacy, fomenting frustration and discontent. Moreover, holding 
parliamentary and presidential elections under the current constitution could lead to a 
presidential system that is not so dissimilar from the one in place under Mubarak’s regime. 
Furthermore, of over the next months, if the interim authorities fail to restore security and the 
rule of law in the country, acts of intimidation, unfair practices and frauds are likely to resurface 
in upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections.  
As people increasingly feel that the spirit of the revolution has been lost in the name of stability 
and socio-economic conditions are not tackled, protests and labour unrest are likely to intensify. 
As a result, frictions between the army and protesters may emerge more forcefully, with the 
former being tempted to make large-scale use of force and repression against demonstrations, 
particularly if protests are not sustained by a large popular consensus. Also sectarian tensions 
could degenerate if the interim authorities fail to restore the rule of law. The persistent state of 
insecurity on the streets, protests, labour unrest and the spread of religious intolerance may 
increasingly strengthen counter-revolutionary tendencies among citizens, working in favour of 
those seeking to keep the old regime in place. Most Egyptians could acquiesce to the current 
status quo and support the kind of moderate transition proposed by the military, opting for less 
substantial, but at least certain, change. The outcome of the recent constitutional referendum, 
which was held on 19 March 2011, may in part suggest that most Egyptians support this kind of 
conservative change.125 Another possible implication of growing social, political and sectarian 
tensions is that the Supreme Council, which now appears united and homogeneous, could 
become factionalized based on rival personalities and competing interests. In this context, an 
overt military coup should not be ruled out.126  
These developments could open the stage for an authoritarian involution and further aggravate 
Egypt’s socio-economic challenges. If Egypt’s political transition takes the direction of a 
controlled and unfinished political transformation, which preserves the old system of power, the 
country may fail to address its main long-term socio-economic challenges. Since Egypt’s 
political transition is backed by the military and regime loyalists, public authorities will have no 
interest in tackling crony capitalism and pervasive corruption. Moreover, in so far as Egypt’s 
political situation remains unclear and unstable, this may discourage private and foreign 
investment. In addition, if the new parliament will be poorly representative, Egypt’s future 
economic and social policies will continue to reflect the interests of a limited number of people, 
eventually the most conservative forces of the country. This said, in the absence of effective 
policies that ease the crisis and respond to Egypt’s urgent socio-economic problems, social 
discontent is unlikely to be contained. 
The chances for a transition towards state sustainability, that is Egypt’s transition to democracy, 
appear thus unpredictable. However, the trajectory of Egypt’s political transition will depend on 
                                                     
125 However, some of those who voted yes to the referendum may have had a different argument, which is 
that they want to move quickly to a civilian government in order to start a radical transition (see for 
example, Ursula Lindsey, “Referendum around the corner”, 17/03/2011 (http://www.arabist.net/ 
blog/tag/constitution). 
126 Jeffrey White, “Egypt's Military in Power: Dynamics, Challenges, Prospects”, Policy Watch, 
22/02/2011 (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3310). As the Jeffrey White 
notes “the Egyptian military contains multiple centers of power, with senior officers standing at their 
heads”.  
EGYPT: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL TRANSITION | 27 
whether or not a broad spectrum of political and social forces will be able to influence the future 
course of events. In particular, youth groups appear to have a great potential in conducting 
Egypt’s transition toward a more promising scenario as they appear among the most dynamic 
and vibrant actors in the current political landscape. Albeit still divided and fragmented, they 
could play a more incisive role in next months and years provided that they scale up their 
strategy. Among others, this means: elaborating a clear and effective platform vis-à-vis the 
Military Council and the next government with regard to both political and socio-economic 
matters; evolving into more organized forces and identifying their leadership; and trying to 
respond to ordinary people’s demands. Coordination among youth and other civil society 
groups is also necessary in order to articulate a more effective response to the top-down 
approach so far adopted by the Military Council. Should youth groups and other civil society 
groups, including independent labour unions and women’s movements, succeed in bringing 
some of their representatives into the new parliament, they will be well placed to shape Egypt’s 
political and economic agenda and ensure that Egypt’s transition to democracy moves forward. 
In order to ensure Egypt’s transition to state sustainability, the EU is called to play a key role, 
supporting both political and economic reforms. The EU could contribute to encourage Egypt’s 
transition to democracy in multiple ways. To avoid an authoritarian involution, the EU should 
send clear and unequivocal signals of condemnation to the interim and future authorities in case 
of violations of human rights or evidence of political regression. In this regard, for example, the 
use of conditionality by the EU should also be revamped (Cassarino & Tocci, 2011). Moreover, 
the EU should start dialoguing with a whole range of political and social actors in the country, 
from moderate Islamists to new secular political and social forces, as well as discuss future EU 
support to Egypt’s political transition jointly with governmental authorities as well as civil and 
political groups. Furthermore, the EU should rethink its whole strategy toward Egypt by 
mainstreaming a “youth perspective” in the political and economic reforms it supports. This 
means, for example, prioritising economic policies that explicitly target job creation for the 
young; assessing the specific impact of structural economic reforms such as trade liberalisation 
on youth; engaging directly with youth movements and assist them, and so on. A gender-
sensitive approach to political and economic reform should also be adopted. Finally, the EU 
needs to establish appropriate mechanisms to make it sure that new funds allocated to support 
Egypt’s political transition do not serve the interests of the old power system (Cassarino & 
Tocci, 2011). 
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